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Doing and Being: A Metaphysic 
of Persons from an Ontology of 
Action
Simon Smith
Abstract
A significant and worrying lacuna lies at the heart of neuroethics: viz., a coher-
ent conception of personal identity. Philosophically, the consequences are seri-
ous; morally, they are disastrous. The entire discourse is constrained by a narrow 
empiricism, oblivious to its own metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions; 
worse still, it remains hostage to a latent Cartesianism, which logically and onto-
logically isolates neuroethicists from their subjects. Little wonder neuroethics lacks 
an anchor for its normative judgements. This chapter aims to supply that anchor. 
The key lies in action: action as essentially personal; acts owned; acts intended; and 
acts that embody those intentions that embody meaning. Such acts are the primary 
manifestation of ‘personhood’; they are also socially oriented, therefore morally 
interesting. Action locates persons in a world of objects and, most importantly, 
others. Crucially, relocating neuroethics within this context of personal activity 
supplies the logical and ontological foundations for both its judgements and its 
participants.
Keywords: action, agency, anti-metaphysical, applied metaphysics, Austin Farrer, 
intending, intentionality, interaction, interpersonal, Ludwig Feuerbach, neuroethics, 
personal identity, personalism, personalist metaphysics, persons
1. Introduction
A significant and worrying lacuna lies at the heart of neuroethical debate. 
What it lacks is the anchor of a desideratum: namely, a full and proper understand-
ing of persons. Given that persons and personal relations are the neuroethicist’s 
primary subjects, both of observation and judgement, this is no minor omission. 
Philosophically, its consequences are serious; morally, they are disastrous. They 
leave neuroethics caught on the prongs of a fork quite as uncomfortable as any 
David Hume might proffer. On one side, the entire discourse is constrained by 
a kind of empiricism, narrowly reductive and oblivious to its own metaphysical 
and epistemological presuppositions; an empiricism constituted not by controlled 
experiment but by the products of an outdated and radically abstract rationalism-
cum-realism. On the other, and pointing uncomfortably in the opposite direction, is 
a latent Cartesianism that logically and ontologically isolates the neuroethicist from 
her subjects. Ultimately, both sides can only end by eliminating the moral subject, 
so drive the discourse into literal non-sense. Little wonder, then, that neuroethics 
lacks an anchor for its normative judgements.
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This chapter aims to supply that anchor, to articulate a conception of persons 
that will overcome this piercingly divisive dichotomy. It does so, not by privileg-
ing one side over the other; a pointless exercise in any event, since neither one is 
coherent and, besides, they terminate in the coinciding of reductive and flattened 
abstractions with inflationary, transcendentalised ones. Rather, the dichotomy is 
overcome by a conception of consciousness grounded in action: action as essentially 
personal; actions owned, intended; actions that embody those intentions, embody 
meaning. Such actions are the most fundamental manifestation of ‘personhood.’ 
They are also socially oriented, therefore morally interesting. Action locates persons 
in a world of objects and, most importantly, others. Crucially, locating neuroethics 
within this context of personal activity supplies the logical and ontological founda-
tions for both its judgements and its participants.
It is in this empirical sense—the philosophically well-brought-up reader may be 
reassured to learn—that our conception of persons is to be understood as metaphys-
ical. Our aim, in short, is not to critique the neurosciences or rebut their discoveries. 
It is no part of our case to deny the role played by understanding the brain and 
brain-function in understanding consciousness and ‘personhood.’ We wish, rather, 
simply to demonstrate that—if we may be forgiven—there is more to persons than 
meets the fMRI.
Personal action is ontologically primitive; it is also empirically, which is to say 
experientially, irrefragable. I cannot deny the reality of my actions without self-
stultification, let alone self-contradiction; no more can I deny the actions of others, 
actions in which my own are but one ingredient. Action is the foundation, the 
condition, of experience, so meets Ockham’s razor, edge to edge. As such, action is 
also anti-metaphysical. It refutes absolutely those classical abstractions that claim 
existence beyond or apart from our experience, the being or essence, secure in 
its ontological priority, which, having no effect upon us, makes no claim on our 
knowledge.
Put simply, personal action is an anti-metaphysical metaphysics. As such, it 
is also an applied metaphysics. It supplies the clue to real existence, such as the 
ephemera of mere appearance and classical being-concepts cannot do. In the words 
of the Oxford philosopher and theologian, Austin Farrer, esse est operari: to be is to 
act, better still, to interact [1, p. 21].
There is one further point before embarking on the discussion proper. What 
follows operates solely from a philosophical perspective; for it is this perspective, 
we are reliably informed, that neuroethics most sorely needs. As such, we hope to 
introduce to current neuroethical debates several thinkers with whom the reader 
may be unfamiliar but who may, nevertheless, have a valuable contribution to make.
2. Empiricism, realism, and absence
Let us begin with an account, in general terms, of the philosophical problem 
circumscribed by this lacuna in the discourse.
It is tempting, at first, to state the obvious and assert that the dichotomy 
threatening to tear neuroethics asunder is a product of reductive physicalism or 
philosophical materialism. Such reductivism is, after all, characteristic of the sci-
entific method that determines the course of neuroscience and so must inform the 
neuroethicist’s outlook. In consequence, said neuroethicist will inevitably identify 
consciousness with the neurological, i.e. physical, processes mapped by fMRI scans 
and, therefore, persons with brains. All this may be true. And yet, we would do well 
to remember that the obvious does not always stand on solid philosophical ground; 
besides which, the assertion is easily countered.
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During the last century, the physical sciences have seen such extraordinary—one 
might even say miraculous—advances in almost every area of human knowledge that 
their efficacy is not seriously to be gainsaid. The origins and nature of our species, 
of the universe, of life itself, have been brought within the purview of human 
understanding, thanks in no small part to the rigorous and systematic application 
of scientific method. That method’s powers of description and prediction have 
repeatedly and with remarkable consistency proved their worth; that the exercise 
of such powers stands firmly upon evidence which can, by and large, be replicated 
and validated surely settles the matter. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to 
imagine what more scientific method and its practitioners could reasonably do to 
demonstrate their epistemic credentials.
So much for tilting at windmills. In reality, we surrender to that first temptation 
and point our superior philosophical finger at the neuroscientist, only to commit the 
very mistake we accuse her of, thereby reinforcing an already apparently intractable 
conflict between two different modes of thinking. Fortunately, it is an important 
principle of our anti-metaphysical metaphysics that pointing fingers point in two 
directions at once: acts unfold in consequences, so identify the objects on which 
they bear; simultaneously, however, they reveal intentions and, crucially, the agent 
of intentions. The root of the problem, that is, lies not in a faulty science, but in bad 
philosophy; our obvious assertion is itself symptomatic of the very confused and 
erroneous thinking that gives rise to the problem. We have, in short, transformed 
method into metaphysic, and a wholly incompatible metaphysic at that.
The results are incompatible because the transformation issues in some form 
of realism. It is not, perhaps, that naïve realism which supposes, in Russell’s pithy 
phrase, ‘things are what they seem.’ Nevertheless, it is close cousin to that self-same 
‘plebeian illusion’ which Einstein described, ‘according to which things “are” as they 
are perceived by us through our senses;’ excepting that, in this instance, experiment 
and observation substitute for sensory perceptions [2, p. 20]. In fact, this substitu-
tion means that our method-cum-metaphysic mirrors most closely Peter Byrne’s 
‘innocent realism’ [3]. This, we are told, ‘merely reflects on the content of our 
empirical claims, notes that most of them do not speak about how the world looks 
from a human perspective and concludes that the world, its things and properties, is 
for the most part independent of us and our representations’ [3, p. 40]. That we do 
not articulate our presuppositions, it does not, of course, follow that there are none 
to articulate. However, the point is clear: no matter what the epistemic medium may 
be, we are still claiming to identify, to know about, a world that lies, logically and 
ontologically, beyond the reach of any actual or possible experience.
Any such claim must prove deeply problematic for the empirically minded, not 
least because it marks an attempt to found scientific knowledge on that which is 
a priori unknowable.1 The realist claim to know the world as it is in itself is one for 
which no evidence, for or against, can be found. We do not have the epistemic tools 
needed to “get behind” our experiences even to establish that such a world exists, let 
alone what it might be like. Logically speaking, therefore, the claim is evidently not 
false as such, but meaningless. To gloss over such implications, as Byrne does, with 
an airy expression such as ‘minimally dualist’ cannot help us [3, p. 35]. Minimal or 
maximal, it makes no difference; the breech is opened between our experience of 
the world and the world as it really is.
Per contra, empirical investigation deals in the products of experience; scientific 
method, in those of experiment. Those products are, in effect, maps of the physical 
1 The realist is faced with, in Farrer’s words, ‘an X absolutely undefined;’ and so must answer the ques-
tion, ‘How do I know that it is not the snort of a hippopotamus or the left great toe of an archangel or the 
taste of asparagus?’ [4, p. 88].
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universe, diagrams, not of the world as it is in se, but as it is diagrammatisable: 
known and knowable by those who explore and explain it. This may seem clearest in 
those fields, such as quantum physics and speculative cosmology, where mathemat-
ics is the lingua franca. It should, perhaps, be clearer still in those where computer 
modelling has become a vital tool, as in the cognitive and, specifically, neurosci-
ences themselves.
Those maps, models, and diagrams are endowed with objectivity by the for-
mulation and application of rules for their construction, rules that constitute the 
theoretical framework within which any scientific enquiry must be pursued. The 
more completely and systematically those rules can be defined, the more likely it is 
they will supply objective facts; but they are not and cannot be ‘independent of us 
and our representations’ as the realist imagines. They are objective insofar as they 
overcome the limitations of the individual enquirer’s perspective by abstracting 
from the subjective immediacy of ordinary sense experience. As the philosopher 
and physical chemist, Michael Polanyi explained, rules disregard the individual’s 
‘normal approach to experience,’ so remain ‘unaffected by the state of the person 
accepting… [them].’ They come ‘between our senses and the things of which our 
senses otherwise would have gained a more immediate impression,’ so regulate the 
organisation and interpretation of those impressions. What is more, and in some 
ways more important, those rules are open to evaluation by all those qualified and 
equipped to do so: viz., the community of enquirers. Hence, their objectivity is 
underwritten by universal acceptance: the acceptance of all those participating in 
scientific research, whatever their field [5, pp. 3–4].
To suggest, as we have done, that empiricism and metaphysical realism are 
incompatible may be strictly true, but it is also, in one rather limited sense, 
somewhat misleading. In fact, there comes a point within the rationalist’s abstract 
conceptualising when the opportunity arises for, not merely for compatibility, but 
for full-blown coincidence. This is the precise point at which realism becomes ideal-
ism and vice versa.
For realism, the point arrives when it finally acknowledges the implications of 
its supposedly ‘minimal dualism’: ‘how we say things are is one thing, how things 
really are is another’ [3, p. 115]. Empiricism, by contrast, reaches this point when 
it conceives itself as a kind of phenomenalism or sense datum theory. In search of 
absolute objectivity, it adopts the pose of the passive observer, there only to discover 
that its ‘only contact with objects, and with the world of physical things, is through 
perception, in which objects are presented to…[the] passive mind’ [6, p. 50].2 Stuart 
Hampshire called this the ‘deepest mistake in empiricist theories descending from 
Berkeley and Hume;’ that is, the ‘representation of human beings as passive observ-
ers receiving impressions from “outside” of the mind, where the “outside” includes 
their own bodies’ [6, p. 47]. Faced, not with real things, but only appearances, 
phenomena, the products of our sensory apparatus, the empiricist, like the real-
ist, is forced to admit that ‘we know nothing about that part of the world existing 
independently of us’ [3, p. 44].
The root cause of this metaphysical mistake lies in the assumption that the neu-
roscientist’s models and diagrams obtain a precise correspondence with the objects 
modelled and diagrammatised. In representing the biochemical processes of the 
brain, it is supposed, the fMRI scanner supplies a literal image of, not the corollary 
of consciousness, but of consciousness itself. Persons, then, are at most a product 
of, and at least equivalent to, those biochemical processes.
2 See also Farrer: ‘Abuse of the analogy between sight and understanding is one of the great philosophical 
delusions’ [7, p. 29].
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The difficulties that beset such reductive conceptualising are both numerous and 
notorious; not least, is the tendency to eliminate the moral subject, thereby render-
ing the whole neuroethical debate redundant. There is little profit to be had from 
arguing about the moral properties and capabilities of physical processes which are 
incapable of choice and therefore of responsibility. Any attempt to do so can be no 
more than anthropomorphic projection: the imaginative conception of impersonal 
forces as personal ones, which are themselves, we must remember, reducible to the 
very forces being imaginatively conceived. The rank confusion and, indeed, circu-
larity, entailed by such a move is, we trust, entirely obvious.
A more serious problem, however, may be that equating persons to sheer 
physical process threatens to eliminate the possibility of meaningful discourse. It 
does so because, in and of themselves, physical processes do not possess logical 
properties. The firing of neurones may occur or it may not, but such an event can-
not be true or false. There is, as Farrer points out, ‘no physical act… which consists 
in [affirming or] negating,’ [8, p. 41] only the actualising of one particular process 
or another, the impact of one force or another. Determine conscious, personal 
actions, such as the forming of hypotheses or the performing of experiments, 
as nothing but physical processes functioning according to causal regularities, 
however, and we refute the ‘whole assumption of logical study. In effect, we deny 
that ‘meaning governs the formation of discourse’ [8, p. 79]. Not only does this 
put paid to all forms of systematic enquiry, such as the sciences and philosophy, it 
leaves us, as P.F. Strawson pointed out, unable to explain the meaning or function 
of personal pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘my’, ‘you’ and ‘your’ [9, p. 98]. The realist, in 
short, lacks the means to identify herself or anyone else.
It is worth repeating, for clarity’s sake, that it is not the reductive materialism, 
so called, of the neuroscientist or her methodology at fault here; it is the realism 
of the philosopher. The moral and metaphysical consequences of that are quite 
serious enough to be going on with, not least because they tempt us into that latent 
Cartesianism alluded to at the beginning of this chapter.
Put simply, the neuroscientist may, if she chooses, conceive of the subjects of her 
research in purely physical terms, but she cannot conceive herself in the same way. 
Deny this, and she must concede that her own descriptions of neurological phe-
nomena and all the activities that give rise to them are themselves purely physical 
phenomena. As such, they must be governed by the same laws of cause and effect 
that govern all other physical phenomena. There can be no exceptions: the formula-
tion of hypotheses, the devising and performing of experiments to test them, the 
analysing of results; the sharing of ideas: none of these events can be governed by 
meaning.
But that is absurd. The neuroscientist’s experiments do not occur, either by 
accident, or as a function of causal impacts; no more than do the institutions in 
which neuroscientists work. They are intended activities that someone—as opposed 
to something—meant to do.3 Their enactment is governed, as all personal actions are 
governed, by the ideas being expressed and explored; specifically, they are governed 
by the meaning of the terms in which they and the methodology used for exploring 
them are expressed. Ultimately, they are governed by the rules, the conventions and 
traditions, of the scholarly community to which the neuroscientist belongs. That is 
the social and intellectual framework in which her work is undertaken and without 
which would not be possible, let alone meaningful. Logically speaking, then, what is 
true of persons and brains in general cannot be true of the neuroscientist herself in 
3 See Robert Spaemann: ‘[t]o be ‘someone’ is not a property of a thing, whether animate or inanimate; 
it is not a predicate of some previously identified subject. Whatever we identify, is identified either as 
someone or as something from the word go’ [10, p. 237].
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particular. To avoid self-contradiction, she must, as Farrer put it, take herself ‘clean 
out of the system of nature’ [8, p. 79].4 She cannot be physical as the subjects of her 
research are physical because physicality reduces to causal uniformity. Ontologically 
speaking, therefore, she must conceive of herself as utterly unlike the persons and 
brains found in her neuroscientific descriptions. She is, by necessity, a different 
order of being.
Having styled herself, no doubt unwittingly, after Descartes’ res cogitans, the 
neuroscientist-cum-neuroethicist finds herself without a physical modus operandi: 
i.e. a body. She has logically and ontologically disconnected from her sensory 
apparatus and, consequently, all conceivable objects of experience. Her thoughts, 
then, whatever they may be about, have no experiential content; what remains but 
thought thinking itself in isolation? Most poignantly, perhaps, her thoughts can 
have no moral content either, for she has neither means nor opportunity to encoun-
ter moral selves. She cannot, in fact, even be sure that any others like herself exist, 
as Descartes himself memorably observed [11, p. 85]. Finally, and perhaps worst 
of all, along with her physicality, she has surrendered even the most basic forms of 
self-reference and self-knowledge. In abstraction from its modus operandi, thought 
thinking itself lacks the ‘directedness’ or ‘aboutness’, which makes it what it is. In 
abstraction, consciousness cannot act deliberately or intentionally. The attempt to 
preserve some notion of meaningful activity from physical reduction has backfired. 
Real relations have been surrendered to arbitrary connections, the random colli-
sions and mutual modifications of impersonal forces: no consciousness required. 
Echoing Hampshire, the neuroscientist is forced to admit that ‘I do not know how I 
would identify myself as a disembodied being and I do not know what this hypoth-
esis means’ ([6], p. 50; see also [9], p. 102).
The bridge between consciousness and the world is broken. We no longer have 
the means to identify other persons or even ourselves, let alone effect any kind of 
moral impact. The question we must face, then, is this: under such circumstances of 
Cartesian ego-isolation, what, in the end, is neuroethics actually about?
3. Empiricism, action, and presence
To answer that question, we need only return to our empirical starting point. 
Consciousness must be reconnected with the world; an easy task since we have, the 
sciences remind us, the very tools to hand. As Ludwig Feuerbach put it, ‘the neces-
sity of this connection is only sensation’ [12, p. 52]. So saying, Feuerbach admon-
ishes us to reject the demand for mind-independent reality and turn instead to those 
engaged in exploring and explaining the world, those for whom ‘[t]ruth, reality and 
sensation are identical’ [12, p. 51]. Only there we shall find the conditions of real 
knowledge. In their activities, he argued, we may plainly see that ‘[o]nly a sensuous 
being is a true and real being. Only through the senses and not through thought for 
[or in] itself is an object given in a true sense.’ Crucially, we must be as rigorous as 
Feuerbach in the application of this principle, so insist that ‘not only the external 
4 This, as Farrer observed, gives rise to a whole host of curious questions, not the least of which concerns 
the place of the neuroscientist herself in evolutionary history. How, that is, did the neuroscientist’s own 
mind evolve? Since it is no longer a feature of the natural universe, neither is it subject to the require-
ments of ‘natural utility’ or ‘survival value’ as these terms are currently understood. According to Farrer, 
it seems that the neuroscientist can only consider the existence of her own mind as being some kind of 
‘treat’ or gift bestowed upon her by nature. Such a supposition, however, evidently requires the kind and 
degree of personification of the natural world that is hardly tenable [8, p. 78].
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but also the internal, not only the flesh but also the mind, not only the object but 
also the ego are objects of the senses’ [12, p. 58].
That ‘sensuousness’ lays the foundations for a more cogent and, ultimately, 
altogether practical epistemology. At the same time, it provides the terms for 
constructing—or perhaps more accurately, construing—an empirically sound meta-
physics. According to Marx Wartofsky, the key to both epistemology and meta-
physics may be found in a ‘much-inflated yet workaday German expression’ [13, 
p. 18]. With it, he argues, Feuerbach could unlock the significance of sensuousness 
and sensory experience while resisting the Cartesian lure to transform empiricism 
into phenomenalism and physical reduction into realism. In Feuerbach’s hands, that 
is, sensory experience is not ‘to be understood…on the “observer” or “perceiving 
subject” or “spectator” model of [traditional or simple] empiricist epistemology.’ 
By extension, consciousness is neither ‘a conglomerate of physical atoms, nor…a 
bundle of sense impressions’ [13, p. 5]. Rather, Feuerbach’s empiricism, his sense 
and sensibility, points to a conception or ‘model of a being that is already involved 
in the world by its very nature. The context of sensation is therefore this primary 
involvement, this Dasein’ [13, p. 377].
While it is perfectly true that, for Feuerbach as for Heidegger, ‘[t]o-be-here 
[Dasein] is the primary being, the primary determination,’ [12, p. 61] this Dasein 
is not, nota bene, that later and better known manifestation: Heidegger’s neutral 
substrate, which apparently lacks the virtue of being any particular being, any 
particular where; in David’s Jasper’s words, ‘not…my being or any specific “being”…
[but] simply “being there” in the universe’ [14, p. 104]. Contrariwise, Feuerbach’s 
Dasein is a philosophical baseline, for Dasein or ‘being here’ is active existence. 
Wartofsky explains: it denotes ‘the original locus of being itself, as a spatio-temporal 
here and now, a concrete being here and now’ [13, p. 376; emphasis added].
Metaphysically speaking, it follows from this that consciousness and the world 
are ontologically co-terminus: the two cannot be separated, are not ‘abstractable 
in isolation as a subject that has then to be put in relation to an object’ [13, p. 377]. 
Instead, Hampshire agreed, we are all of us only aware of ourselves as ‘one item 
of furniture in the world,’ ‘one physical fact among others’ [6, pp. 45, 46]. It is, 
moreover, only by identifying those other physical facts that we are able to fix our 
own situation in the world. In such identifications lie the most basic existential 
conditions for both subject and object. This is because ‘here’ and ‘there’ are not 
absolute positions in space, but relative locations; more, they are concrete stages of 
interaction.
Otherwise put, the very possibility of self-identification depends logically on 
being one ‘self-moving body among other bodies’ [6, p. 46]. The ‘being’ that is here 
must, if it is to identify itself as a self at all, be able to change its position in relation 
to those other physical facts: move from here to there. The coherent conception 
of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ demand it, for only by being able to change its position 
in relation to other objects can it control its access to the world, its point of view. 
Further, only by controlling that point of view can it claim ownership of it, of, that 
is, its perceptions; and only by controlling and claiming ownership of its point of 
view, can it direct its attention to particular features of its environment. Last, but by 
no means least, only by doing all of that can any ‘being’ distinguish itself from the 
other physical features which constitute its environment. At its simplest, perhaps, 
‘[o]nly by the exclusion of others from the space it occupies does personality prove 
itself to be real’ [15, p. 91]. In this, it differs absolutely from the ‘abstract, vague, 
empty personalities’ of Cartesian realism.
All of which means that our Feuerbachian Dasein, ‘being here’, is necessarily ‘being’ 
in the operative mode, fully expressed or actualised in ‘doing that’, whatever ‘that’ may 
be. In short, consciousness is a mode of activity: not a being, but a way of being.
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What we have on our hands, philosophically speaking, is a logically and ontolog-
ically primitive conception of human being as physically (and, ultimately therefore, 
socially) embodied. Embodiment delimits the worldly physical fact that conscious-
ness, personality, is, so determines the self, locating it in one place rather than any 
other. It supplies what Feuerbach would call the essential ‘property of impenetrabil-
ity,’ which distinguishes the self as one object rather than any other.
The body alone is that negativing, limiting, concentrating, circumscribing force, 
without which no personality is conceivable. Take away from your personality its 
body and you take away that which holds it together. The body is the basis, the 
subject of personality. Only by the body is a real personality distinguished from the 
imaginary one of a spectre [15, p. 91].
No inert substance, then, but the locus of a self-moving, self-directing agency; 
bodily existence is the focal point from which the impacts and interactions wherein 
consciousness elaborates and extemporises itself are expressed. Hence, Feuerbach’s 
avowal: ‘I am a real, sensuous being, and, indeed, the body in its totality is my ego, 
my essence itself.’ Otherwise put, the body supplies consciousness with that much-
needed modus operandi whereby experience is granted and thought filled with 
experiential content. It is for this very reason that Feuerbach would so vehemently 
repudiate ‘those philosophers who pluck out their eyes that they may see’—or as 
Wartofsky tellingly translates it, ‘think’—‘better’. ‘[F]or my thought,’ he insisted, 
‘I require the senses, especially sight; I found my ideas on materials that can be 
appropriated only through the activity of the senses’ [13, p. 368, 15, p. xxxiv].
If consciousness is to be sufficiently determinate to know anything or do 
anything, then it must, in Farrer’s phrase, be ‘perfectly embodied;’ at once, both 
subject and object of experience, consciousness is a feature of the world and so ‘does 
nothing here without the body’ [8, p. 60]. Crucially, it is this capacity for doing 
that supplies the ontological and epistemological foundations of a concrete— i.e. 
combinatorial—ego-profile. That is the ground upon which we shall build our 
anti-metaphysical metaphysics. Put simply, the physical extensions of consciousness 
supply our criterion of real being. They do so, because our first and most fundamen-
tal experiences are, as the empiricist knows full well, objects ‘of the senses, percep-
tion and feeling’ [12, p. 55]. So saying, Feuerbach would use action, more properly 
interaction, to elevate empirical principle. Real beings are known, he argued, only 
‘where my self-activity finds its boundary or resistance in the activity of another 
being’ [12, p. 51]. That is why, first Farrer would identify ‘the primitive sense [as] 
“touch”’ [1, p. 232] and then Hampshire would do likewise, describing ‘[t]ouch, 
and not sight, [as]… primitively the most authoritative of the senses, the natural 
criterion of physical reality’ [6, p. 48]. For both men, the reasoning was the same: 
‘because acting upon objects necessarily involves touching, the contact of my body 
with the resisting body that is not my own’ [6, p. 48]. Thus, our very conception of 
‘real’ is conditioned by contact, designating the boundaries laid by ‘resisting bodies’ 
as they impact on our activities.
In accessing our environment, so to speak, we are not simply pushing on an open 
door. We are not, as Farrer put it, ‘swimming in a perfectly featureless medium;’ 
there is no action in vacuo [1, p. 233]. We are, of course, ‘walking the earth among 
all sorts of obstacles,’ obstacles which evoke or elicit our actions, either by resisting 
our efforts to achieve some goal or by providing the means to overcome resistance. 
Those obstacles, those resistances, thereby determine the boundary conditions for 
conscious activity; without them, we could do nothing at all. Indeed, we can only 
walk because the ground beneath our feet provides friction and talk because other 
objects reflect the sounds we make. This is not to say, however, that, in setting the 
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boundaries of our actions, those obstacles also determine their limits. They may 
exhort us in the strongest possible terms not to attempt to imitate the birds; but 
properly managed and controlled, they enable us to build the apparatus which does 
just that. Their resistance, then, is the force against which intentional conscious-
ness, ‘self-activity’, actively defines itself.
It follows from this that the resistance activity by which our environment is 
known cannot be random or arbitrary as such; otherwise our attempts to under-
stand and ultimately control it would be fruitless. Without regularity and predict-
ability, consciousness would have no purchase on the world. Hence, as Farrer 
pointed out, ‘[o]ur conscious experiences find themselves from the start framed by 
this system’ this regularity and predictability [1, p. 67]. Consequently, experience 
of resistance, and our engagement with it, take the form of systematic intercourse 
or controlled interference; that, in turn, supplies consciousness with ‘shape’ or 
‘form’. In other words, the interplay between self-activity and resistance activity 
supplies what Farrer described as the ‘natural unit of thought’ [16, p. 210]. Apart, 
that is, ‘from my experience of impinging upon, and being impinged upon by, other 
things or forces, I have no conceivable clue to physical existence, or physical force, 
or physical interaction’ [16, p. 210]. This is Farrer’s ‘causal solution’ to the problems 
of realism, ‘minimal dualism’. The world, he reminds us, ‘is not known but as the 
playground of human thews and human thoughts; were there no free play, there 
would be no knowledge’ [8, p. 171]. Subject and object are therefore disclosed to 
one another only as agents of ‘free play’; the features or furniture that occupy our 
field of action alongside us ‘only become features and so perceptible in so far as they 
disturb and diversify the field’ [1, p. 234]. In short, the world is (recognisable as) a 
field of conscious activity and real knowledge is a product of our encounters in and 
with this field: one may come to know an object ‘only in so far as it varies the distur-
bances of… [one’s] field—[one] knows it as a class of disturbances.’ We encounter 
‘real being’ as it exercises resistance activity; we recognise it by the ‘imprint’ it 
leaves on our exploratory activities.
To speak ‘objectively,’ then, the world is no more or less than the combination of 
forces that are continuous with our active explorations. This means that the resis-
tance activities by which the world is known to us and the controlled interference 
that constitutes our knowing acts are necessarily coeval: consciousness-and-the-
world—if we may reiterate a central point—are co-constructed, actualised in pari 
materia. ‘The bond to nature, to an objective world,’ as Wartofsky puts it, ‘lies in 
the very form of consciousness as requiring an other, that is, in the subject-object 
relation that is the essential form of human consciousness’ [13, pp. 337–338]. This 
is important; it means that ‘real being’ is no more a corollary of physical effects 
than it is a by-product of conscious projection (as realist philosophers will no doubt 
suppose). ‘Real being’ is the constitutive activity of conscious physical agency, of 
human being.
This takes us to the ground level of a coherent epistemology. It is also the foun-
dation stone of our metaphysics. To explain: from all that has gone before, it fol-
lows that reality as it is known, both by ordinary agents and the most scientifically 
well-equipped investigators, is to be found, not in inert stuff or substance, but in 
dynamic process. In Farrer’s Latin phrase, esse est operari: ‘real being’ is full-bodied 
being-in-action [1, p. 21]. Being fully operational, ‘being’ is also fully interactive, 
for ‘an operatio, energia, has a plurality of elements to it.’ The universe and its 
furniture are not made of ‘solid and stupid lumps of physical matter,’ but of rela-
tively stable patterns of energy, ‘infinitely complicated, minute rhythms of active 
process, without which process, nothing would exist at all’ [17, p. 40]. Pressing 
the point, Farrer explicitly aligned his metaphysics with the great Einsteinian 
advance of the twentieth century, designating ‘[e]nergy, rather than stuff… our 
Neuroethics in Principle and Praxis - Conceptual Foundations
10
ultimate’ [8, p. 52].5 Such sentiments cannot fail to resonate with the astrophysicist 
and speculative cosmologist, indeed, with every scientifically enlightened thinker 
of the modern age. They resonate, too, with that other great metaphysician of 
the time, Alfred North Whitehead, for whom ‘the actual world is a process, and 
that process is the becoming of actual occasions’ [18, p. 22]. In essence, process 
and energia mean the same thing: reciprocal interference, actualities disturbing a 
field of activity comprised of other actualities. Real things, then, are in and as the 
mutual interplay of resistance activity or, as Farrer dubbed it, ‘disturbance-effect’ 
[1, p. 235].
Action, disturbance-effect, is our metaphysical ultimate; esse est operari: to be is 
to act, better, to interact. If this is true of the physical universe, which frames our 
every thought and deed—and the sciences attest that it most assuredly is—then it is 
no less true of the conscious, physical agents who explore and explain that universe. 
In Feuerbachian terms, ‘the mind of man is nothing but the essential mode of his 
activity’ [15, p. 171]. Disturbance-effect is the key to consciousness: ‘that to which 
the personal act corresponds is not, indeed, any system of stuff, however fine-
drawn, but a sequence of activity’ [8, p. 26].
Thus, to identify what philosophers of mind used to call the ‘seat of conscious-
ness,’ Farrer averred, we need only allow consciousness to pick its own seat by sitting 
in it [8, p. 24]. Do so, and we shall find that the physical ‘seat’, or more dynamically, 
‘vehicle’, of consciousness is located, not in any one phase or feature of the bodily 
process per se, but in the action-pattern as a whole, the full-scale sweep of bodily 
movement personally executed. Consciousness is actualised or enacted in what 
the agent actually does: the reading of a book, the writing of an essay, the meet-
ing or missing of a deadline. Simultaneously, of course, the action-pattern is the 
operation of all the physical processes involved, including the microscopic motions 
constituting the entire neurological system. That system, in each and every phase of 
its activity, supplies the building blocks of conscious agency. Consciousness itself, 
however, does not bear directly upon those building blocks; no more, of course than 
it bears on the large-scale extensions of the physical organism. Consciousness, as 
we understand and experience it concerns what we intend to do. Otherwise put, we 
do not consciously or intentionally operate the system of electrochemical processes 
running from brain to fingertips any more that we consciously or intentionally oper-
ate the muscles in our arms and hands. What we do is write an essay: our conscious-
ness concentrates upon and is concentrated in those large-scale intentions, trusting 
the system to discharge the neurological patterns that will embody it.
This is not, if we may repeat ourselves for a second time, in anyway intended to 
deny or even diminish the role of the brain in conscious, personal agency. Rather, 
it is to bestow upon the brain its rightful role and place within the larger, bodily 
process, which is conscious agency. To illustrate, Farrer offered an analogy: ‘an 
immensely tenuous, elongated plant, rooted in several different regions of the 
brain, passing its stem through the spinal column, and flowering into performance 
in the hand’ [8, p. 26]. Consciousness, then, is not to be restricted to any particular 
phase of the process: it is not in the firing nerves, the flexing muscles, or the moving 
hand. Consciousness ‘flowers’ or comes into focus in what agents do, but what they 
do is embodied by the entire ‘action plant’ from root to tip. Thus, the ‘whole nerve-
plant from brain to hand is the vehicle or instrument of the behaviour’ [8, p. 26].
This is true even when that vehicle does not appear to be moving very much at 
all. Thinking, for example, about how to frame this sentence is an action and so 
5 See also, Farrer: ‘The notion of energies in a pure or simple state, prior to mutual engagement is physi-
cal nonsense. All activity is mutual, as between energies, and all activity thus mutually engaged changes 
and redistributes itself ’ [7, p. 82].
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requires a ‘nerve-plant’ to embody it, however foreshortened the ‘plant’ may be. For 
thinking, Farrer, reminds us, is the ‘shadow of doing’ and so ‘must be interpreted 
by a full-blooded doing’ [8, p. 39]. (One suspects that this is the point where many 
a neuroscientist and neuroethicist commits their fatal error, mistaking this act of 
interpretation by means of the clue or model of bodily action for ostensive indica-
tion or direct denotative reference; and that way, as we have seen, lies metaphysical 
realism.) For thought apart from overt behaviour, Farrer found an interpretive key 
right under our noses, so to speak. ‘The best sort of characterisation of thinking 
is that it is a sort of talking to ourselves’ [7, 29]. The ‘shadow-patterns’ of thought 
follow same route as speaking, from brain to mouth, taking in lips, jaws, tongue, 
vocal chords and so on. But they do not get so far: the action-pattern is not fully 
enacted and the ‘nerve-plant’ fails to flower in ‘full-blooded doing.’ In this way, the 
act of thinking ‘ghosts’ the act of speaking, stops short of engaging the full physical 
apparatus of bone and muscle.
The risk of physical reduction here is palpable. As we trace out the route of our 
action plant, it ill behoves us to ignore the ontological dangers that lie in wait: the 
abstractions and disjunctions, the dissolution of consciousness into confusion and 
self-contradiction. Forewarned is forearmed, however; almost literally in this case 
for, as Farrer pithily put it, we ‘still have mind on our hands just as much as matter’ 
[8, p. 7].
In fact we have already hinted at the answer more than a little. It lies in the fun-
damental requirement to make sense of human action as meaningful; to recognise 
and understand it as governed, not by the diagrammatic laws of cause and effect, 
but by the rules of discourse and the conventions of the community in which we act. 
It lies, in short, in the logic of intending. Such logic is essentially presuppositional. It 
means that the very concept of action in the full and personal sense—the sense, that 
is, in which we experience it directly in ourselves and the other persons with whom 
we interact—is only complete when coupled to an intending agent: the owner of the 
act. In acting, the agent instantiates both the intentional and consequential motifs 
that make agency what it is: the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of an esse that actualises itself 
purposively, that is, teleologically, by means of some operari. Therein lies meaning: 
both theme and content of the process, without which any act is reduced to mere 
physical event. Stripped of this purposive structure, this ‘before’ and ‘after’, the very 
concept of ‘action’ is unintelligible. Hence Farrer reminds us, the intending that 
arises only in those circumstances to which the physical, bodily pattern ‘reacts and 
only in reacting to them… has neither sense nor function.’ Contain consciousness 
within the bounds of flattened naturalism, that is, and the ‘reaction which con-
sciousness should direct takes place in the occurrence of consciousness;’ and that is 
no consciousness at all [1, p. 235].
Evidently, we have no wish to re-open a logical and ontological chasm so recently 
closed; equally, no simple reduction will do. Instead, Farrer held out for an agency 
‘overplus’ or ‘prior actuality’, insisting that ‘[t]he intending is ahead of the intended, 
though it be but a hairsbreadth’ [8, p. 48].6 Note the repetition; it is as important as 
the differentiation it represents, for it refutes absolutely the separatist tendencies of 
metaphysical realism, demanding instead continuity between intending agent and 
acts intended. Put simply, actions, in the full and personal sense, are intentional; 
they require an agent of sufficient priority to intend them. Like ‘a hairsbreadth’, 
‘sufficient’ denotes the briefest logical pause between becoming aware of one’s 
circumstances and responding to them: sufficient, that is, to displace merely reflex 
action while the owner-esse of intending consciousness takes her seat, putting the 
intended pattern of physical action in gear and driving it off.
6 I am indebted to Charles Conti for pointing out the significance of the double reference here.
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We are not, as all of us are no doubt aware, acting and intending in a vacuum. 
Action and, indeed, everything we have said about it, locates us in a physical and 
a social situation. For, as we have already observed, action is always and necessar-
ily interaction, so involves a ‘plurality of elements.’ All of those elements are, in a 
sense, physical objects; many of them are also personal others, intending agents like 
ourselves. The logic of intending reminds us of this, while also circumscribing the 
minimal requirements of prior actuality: the demands placed upon us by the pres-
ence of other persons. So much can be clearly seen, J.L. Austin has demonstrated, 
from the language of apology and excuses [19]. That we need and, fortunately, are 
able to apologise for our actions, not only reveals the personal nature of the context 
in which we act, but also throws the logical emphasis back upon the intending by 
allowing us to express what we meant to do.
Put simply, acting persons aspire to a lively moral perspicuity by adopting 
what Charles Conti describes as a ‘metaphysical [i.e. ethically informed] vantage 
point’ [20, p. 185]. We seek thereby to oversee the means towards realising conse-
quences we actually intend and so avoid colliding with other agents. We view our 
proceedings, then, not as a ‘Cartesian cogitator but as actor-self and monitor-self 
simultaneously;’ and so ‘perform our being as we experience it’ [20, p. 185]. In such 
performances the Cartesian cogito is revised and returned, chastened by experi-
ence and recruited by agency metaphysics to do its duty metaphorically. Physical 
extension coupled with social orientation symbolically transform the realist’s non-
perspectival perspective [3, p. 40] into a concrete analogue for self-transcendence 
in and as ‘the “owner-occupier” of deeds done; the “performer-director” of the 
drama of its life’ [20, p. 184]. This is the ‘I’ of the act, the self that listens to itself, 
hopefully before speaking, but often as not through an in-built ‘moral “playback” 
function’ [20, p. 187]. Registering the reaction on the face of the other, the self seeks 
to make amends by resubmitting its acts for review, reinterpreting them with a view 
to qualifying intentions and mitigating unintended effects. Such are the lessons we 
all learn to invest in our proceedings, gathering ‘the rosebuds of experience in daily 
reflection so as to remove the thorns of further disgrace’ [20, p. 187].
The social orientation of action coincides—and does occasionally collide—
with the ‘internal’ world of conscious deliberation: ‘We sense our compresence 
with others, so intuit the obligation to act’ [20, p. 186]. Alive to that ‘compresence’, 
conscious agency is quickened by the possibilities of physical interaction, personal 
intercourse. That defines the obligation in action: simultaneously enacted—
obligations undertaken – and intrinsic to the logic of action—the ‘ought’ of my 
intending. Therein, Conti concludes, lies the teleology of action: being ‘retrospec-
tive and reflective all at once,’ [20, p. 184] end-oriented acts factor means, motive, 
and opportunity into intended execution.
Unearthing the roots of thought and action, we find that the logic of intending 
underwrites the concept ‘person’ as a social reality. Logic is not, however, always the 
most reliable guide to what does and does not exist.7 In view of our much-vaunted 
empiricism, something a little more concrete would, no doubt, be appreciated. 
After all, as Farrer reminds us, ‘[i]t is not as though we believed in our neighbour’s 
personality because logical philosophers are able to exhibit the self-contradiction 
involved in denying it’ [7, p. 128; emphasis added]. No more, of course, than we 
should expect logical proof of our parents personhood; do so and we surely add the 
insult of unnecessary demonstration to the injury of inexcusable doubt. Neighbours 
and parents, friends, lovers, even teachers: they do not constitute a logical puzzle 
for us to solve. Their presence, their reality, is a matter of practical urgency; 
7 This, as J.N. Findlay reminds us, is because logic provides a guide to the use (and abuse) of language, not 
what does or does not exist [21]. Cf. Waismann: [22, 23].
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incontrovertibly so, since our first encounter with other persons finds us supremely 
helpless. John Macmurray put the point with paradoxical perspicuity when he 
pointed out how well ‘adapted… to being unadapted’ we are, ‘adapted,’ that is, ‘to a 
complete dependence’ on others [24, p. 48]. In short, we are ‘made to be cared for’; 
and cared for we must be if we are to survive. Being so ‘adapted’, how fortuitous 
then that we are born into a manifold of personal agencies or, to warm the face of 
such schematics, a world of families and friends, of intrinsically personal love-
relationships. Farrer concurred: ‘[f]rom first infancy,’ he said, ‘our elders loved us, 
played us, served us and talked us into knowing them’ [25, p. 74]. Had they failed 
us, we would not be here to question their reality or cast aspersions on the mean-
ing of their being. Indeed, we only learned to talk ‘because they talked to us;’ and 
in that talk, consciousness took its first stuttering, stumbling steps: ‘[b]ecause we 
could first talk, we can now think; that is, we can talk silently to the images of the 
absent, or… pretend to be our own twin, and talk to ourself ’ [25, p. 74].
Consciousness, then, is awakened, better still invested, in us by those who supply the 
mental and physical resources with which we explore our world, shape our place and part 
in it. Otherwise put, our parents and teachers—among many, many others—supply the 
primary conditions of our conduct, both mode and circumstance of developing personal-
ity. We can think, that is, talk to ourselves, because they first talked to us and taught us to 
reply. Sometimes, we can even think objectively, that is, abstract from the immediacy of 
experience because they taught us rules for consistently organising and interpreting it. 
Those rules, as we have seen, they called theories: scientific, philosophical, psychological, 
etc.; they mitigate the particularity of my perspective by co-opting me into a community 
of explorers, so make me one of them.
In this way, others supply the terms and conditions of our actions and transac-
tions, thereby staking their claim to the very self they helped create, instilling 
it with what Feuerbach called ‘the inner life of man’: our social self, our ‘species 
being’ [15, p. 2]. Like her talk, the other is internalised, metaphysically and morally 
incorporated into the structure of the self. This process displaces the subjectivity of 
the subject: its needs, activities, perspective—all felt as intrinsically, immediately 
present and real, as its self—these are first ‘filtered’ by a more basic presence in the 
shape of the ‘otherness’ ‘inside’. Being ‘filtered’, the self evaluates and re-evaluates 
itself, conceiving and constructing, re-conceiving and re-constructing, itself in 
and as relation. The self learns to double itself, so play the part of the other within 
it. In the vernacular, we might say I become a self by learning to put myself in the 
place of another: I become a self, an I, by re-enacting that place, that primary oth-
erness; I become a self by being appropriated by others and learning to appropriate 
them in turn. In this way, the transactional structure of social conscience and 
conscious action are built-into the mode and manifestations of self-construction 
by the other. This overrules any ontological privilege or priority the ‘I’ might seek to 
claim over deeper interpersonal connections. Prior actuality cannot belong essen-
tially to the self, for, as Farrer avers, ‘mentality always was a social, not a solitary, 
thing’ [25, p. 74]. Both metaphysically and psychologically, priority resides in the 
other for that is where the self is born.
Taking this one step further, it is, perhaps, sufficiently well known that the 
derivation of the word ‘person’ lies in the Latin persona, meaning ‘an actor’s mask.’ 
A vital metaphor, this: agent and alter-ego in one. The metaphysical hint is unmis-
takable. Give someone a mask, as Oscar Wilde quipped, and they reveal their true 
selves; and in revealing, we add, so they become. As consciousness is bodied forth 
by the other (inside) so it is embodied in the self. Theirs is the mask we wear, the 
persona we appropriate and transform into a self, a conscious, personal reality, com-
missioned by the other. Thus does ‘[m]ind… everywhere flow into mind’ [26, p. 143] 
and I learn to play my part in the exchange of perspectives on my self-enactment. 
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Our first performance, then, is no monologue but a dialogue with the other. In such 
transactions, are we made to be self-making.
The essence of consciousness, of ‘personhood’, is fragmentary, consolidated 
by these exchanged perspectives. This is a commonplace of postmodern identity 
theories as well as the ‘metaphysical personalism’ (as Conti’s titled his exegesis of 
Farrer) that we have been mapping here. The ‘unity’ we call a self is actually a func-
tion of that primary dialectic of perspectives, the love-relationships into which we 
are born. In this way, those who had and held us have inexorably bound themselves, 
their image, into our every experience of consciousness. We are who we are by their 
gift; wherein, St. Paul reminds us, works the grace of God [27].8 Others give us the 
tools with which to make or ‘mend’ ourselves (as Eugene O’Neill suggests) using 
that grace as ‘glue’ [28, p. 101].9 They give us the language, the symbols, in which we 
think our thoughts and live our lives.
4. Conclusion
It seems we have, at last, reached the philosophical bottom-line. These first and 
most fertile encounters shape the development of conscious thought and action; 
they are the grounds which supply form and purpose, sometimes even content, 
to our explorations and explanations. This is the well-spring of human being, in 
Martin Buber’s poignant phrase, the ‘cradle of real life’ [22, 29].
Here, then, is an opportune moment to take stock. Let us make the point of 
moral application plain. Immediately obvious is the absence of any ethical theory, 
our conception of persons as active agents offers no system or set of rules for the 
formulation of normative judgements. Being rooted in the personal relations 
wherein we all, quite literally, find ourselves, our anti-metaphysical, applied 
metaphysics is profoundly averse, even hostile, to such things. Indeed, as the history 
of Western philosophy—and any decent textbook—will show, such theorising 
and systematising is always inherently flawed, unable as it is to accommodate the 
messy and complicated cases that moral practice inevitably throws up. Real life is 
never black and white; for every rule there is an exception; although even the best 
system-builders frequently forget this, preferring as they do to exalt their abstract 
conceptual constructs such as reason and utility.
Applied metaphysics may leave us without a moral theory, but it does not leave 
us empty-handed. Instead, it supplies the very anchor that our normative judge-
ments demanded from the start: concrete personal connection, the embodiment of 
moral agency. This rebuts absolutely that Cartesian ghost in—or rather out of—the 
machine, that ‘being-beyond,’ which remains forever quarantined from physical 
experience, physical knowledge, physical reality. And so the transcending ego, 
which passes judgement on a reality it can neither experience nor, consequently, 
understand, is exorcised at last. Along with it, goes the flattened naturalism which 
reduces personal reality to causal mechanism. In their place stands, not a concept, 
but a person, a conscious physical agent. This is the other with whom I am inti-
mately and intrinsically interconnected, the living, breathing reality at the very 
heart of my own existence: co-constituent of my becoming, whose rightful claim 
upon me demands that I reciprocate, respond in kind and participate in his or her 
becoming. We demur at our own risk, for that way lies self-stultification; worse still, 
perhaps annihilation. Deny the presence of the other and coherence is corrupted: 
8 ‘But by the grace of God I am what I am: and his grace which was bestowed upon me was not in vain; but 
I laboured more abundantly than they all: yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me.’
9 ‘Man is born broken. He lives by mending. The grace of God is glue!’
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our entire moral discourse will rot. Reject their claims upon us and our very exis-
tence may be in dire peril. Regard them as mere objects, as a function of physical 
process or even interpenetrating forces, and we transform ourselves likewise. 
Action is reflexive: it reveals the nature of the agent and in revealing, actualises. 
Bluntly, that is, I am who and what I am through the grace (and glue) of others; 
without them, I am not. Therein lies the moral imperative of our anti-metaphysical 
metaphysics.
Philosophically speaking, of course, we have found more than a moral anchor; 
we also have a coherent logical and ontological framework for our discourse. 
Personal action supplies the context in which we may clearly see both the particu-
lar and the general: first, the analyses and judgements of neuroethics; second, 
the discipline as a whole and all its participants. Within this framework we may 
recognise, then understand, and finally overcome the ‘self-sufficing speculation,’ 
[15, p. xxxiv] which threatens to undermine our efforts. On the one hand, we recall 
the personal presuppositions of our empiricism: the epistemological requirements 
of exploring agents that reconnect experience with action, real knowledge with the 
controlled interference which is the neuroscientist’s stock in trade. On the other, it 
reveals and resists the temptation to align methodology too closely with metaphys-
ics. This, in turn, allows us to reconcile those binary oppositions—mind and body, 
intending and intended, subject and object—which do so much to incapacitate 
every branch of moral philosophy. Reconciliation comes, not by over-inflating 
empiricism with the transcendental pretensions of metaphysical realism, but by 
returning us to the only place where those abstract notions can possibly make 
sense. Mind is a mode of bodily action, body the physical manifestation of mind. 
Intending and intended are phases of that manifestation, conceptually separable 
but in reality, i.e. in action, continuous. Subjectivity is essentially other-oriented 
by virtue of being a reflection of the other who invokes and evokes it in us. 
Ethically, it denotes obligations owned: my responsibilities as presupposed and, 
moreover, delimited by my capacity to act in response to a physical and social 
or personal environment. Being a communal act, objectivity is coeval with this 
environment: it represents the truth-conditions and epistemic norms laid down 
by the community of knowing persons. Thus, subject and object are not inde-
pendent as such, but theoretical perspectives, ways of seeing, of thinking about 
and understanding the world, the use of which is sanctioned by that community. 
This does not detract from their truth-value but merely reminds us of the context 
in which they are first negotiated and defined; that is, transacted with the world 
by the community of thinkers. Both ethically and epistemologically, then, these 
theoretical perspectives represent, in their contrasting but congruent ways, the 
very ‘claimingness’ of others that is our anchor.
Ultimately, then, being firmly anchored by our concept of persons to the 
solid, social, and inherently ethical ground that entails it, uncouples neuro-
ethical analyses from the arbitrary dictates and philosophical fiats of classical 
rationalism-cum-realism. Diverted from the rabbit hole of incoherence and 
irrelevance, which awaits so much philosophical discourse, and possessed of a 
renewed social conscience, our thoughts and actions are oriented back towards 
the communities in which even neuroethicists must live and work. Most imme-
diately, perhaps, is the scholarly community whose job it is to map out and 
delineate our discipline. Beyond that, is the academy itself, whose traditions, 
standards, and requirements we have imbibed, deploying them rigorously in our 
own practice. And if we care to look still further, beyond the halls of academe, 
we may even see the society whose various institutions—from the logico-linguistic 
to the socio-political—make our investigations possible and before which our 
contributions will no doubt be held to account.
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